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Abstract
Income and wealth inequality are rising in most countries around the world today. Recognising that this challenge has
become a universal issue, the United Nations agreed in 2015 to seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as part of a
global agenda to transform society. Speciﬁcally, SDG Target 10 commits countries to ‘reduce inequalities within and among
countries’. To what extent SDGs and in particular SDG target 10 can help nations reverse inequality towards a downward
trend is the question we address in this paper. To answer this question, we build on the theory of change underpinning the
goal-based governance characterising the SDGs, then we infer the added value of the SDGs along three criteria: the produc-
tion of a common metric, the capacity to emulate peer pressure, and policy learning within and across countries. Across these
three criteria, our main ﬁnding is that there is much that states can take away from the SDGs to address the problem of rising
inequality, though success is conditional on achieving the buy-in of key actors and epistemic communities for which domestic
inequalities remains a domestic issue and not a global sustainability one.
Policy Implications
• There is much that states can take away from the SDGs to address the problem of rising inequality, though success is con-
ditional on achieving the buy-in of key actors and epistemic communities for which domestic inequalities remains a
domestic issue and not a global sustainability one.
• The ﬁrst major contribution of the SDGs is the old cliche, ‘what gets measured gets done’. The guarantee of standardized,
comparable statistics is likely to serve as a catalyst for political action to reduce inequality. At the very least, it serves as
an enabler for civil society and other non-government institutions to hold governments to account.
• Second, and relatedly, the SDGs create a forum in which countries’ performances are ranked against each other. The SDGs
enable us to distinguish between those countries that are performing well and those falling behind, while serving to
remind political leaders that inequality reduction is not just necessary but possible.
• If a country ranking will be technically feasible thanks to national statistical reports on SDGs, it remains politically tricky.
Ranking countries according to their performance in achieving speciﬁc goals and targets is very unlikely to become part
of the mandate of the UN High Level Political Forum (HLPF). This ranking, which according to us is a key lever for national
action, could be produced instead by coalitions of think tanks and research institutions outside of the UN system.
• Greater focus is required to encourage and vitalise the learning process beyond current state practice at HLPF where the
risk of ‘showcasing’ national strategies and anecdotal successes cannot be discarded. Forums cannot simply serve as plat-
forms for states to selectively clarify their individual successes while overshadowing and exonerating responsibility in areas
where they have underperformed. Creating a platform for countries successfully implementing corrective measures is
therefore vital.
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Income and wealth inequality are rising in most countries
around the world today. Recognising that this challenge has
become a universal issue, the United Nations agreed in
2015 to 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as part
of a global agenda to transform society. Speciﬁcally, SDG
Target 10 commits countries to ‘reduce inequalities within
and among countries’. To that end, the SDG framework calls
on states to articulate nationally speciﬁc implementation
strategies and to put in place monitoring and review pro-
cesses in order to meet the goals.
So far, country responses have been sporadic and inconsis-
tent, and there has been little articulation about what Target
10 means in terms of national-level implementation. Reducing
inequality between countries – that is to say, increasing the
national income of poor countries relatively quicker than rich
countries – has been at the core of development thinking for
decades and motivated the creation of dedicated institutions
such as the International Development Association (1960, as
part of the World Bank Group) and UNCTAD (1964). More
recently, rising inequality within countries, with an overall
increase in top income and wealth shares particularly in high-
income countries like Britain and the United States, combined
with signiﬁcant increases in the coverage of available data,
have brought to light the need to consider within-country dis-
tributional outcomes. However, it is less immediately apparent
what role an international framework can and should play in
mediating within-country inequality. While some contributing
factors like tax evasion, for example, readily lead to the need
for a coordinated response between countries, other factors,
like national taxation and social spending, are considered as
domestic issues traditionally outside the remit of international
governance frameworks. To what extent SDGs and in particu-
lar SDG target 10 can help nations reverse inequality towards
a downward trend is the question we address in this paper.
To answer this question, we proceed in four steps. First, we
review the substantive reasons why within-country inequality
has become a global sustainable development issue (section 1),
and we detail the political process it underwent to become a
stand-alone SDG target (section 2). We build on the theory of
change underpinning the SDGs to set up a framework of anal-
ysis and infer the added value of the SDGs (section 3). Apply-
ing this framework to SDG target 10, we provide an
assessment of the potential contribution of SDGs to inequality
reduction within countries (section 4). We conclude by delin-
eating consistency gaps which would need to be bridged to
signiﬁcantly increase the contribution of SDGs to domestic
income and wealth inequality reduction. Our main ﬁnding is
that there is much that states can take away from the SDGs to
address the problem of rising inequality, though success is
conditional on achieving the buy-in of key actors and epis-
temic communities for which domestic inequalities remains a
domestic issue and not a global sustainability one.
1. Why inequality has become a universal
sustainable development issue
After decades of divergence across countries per capita
income, there is evidence of convergence at the global level
since the 1990s, and in particular since the 2000s (Bour-
guignon, 2015; Milanovic, 2010; Stiglitz, 2013). Global conver-
gence between rich and poor countries has been driven by
Asian countries, ﬁrst China and India, and now the whole
Asian region, where incomes have risen rapidly relative to
advanced economies. However, much remains to be done:
incomes in Asia remain a quarter of those in the developed
world, and convergence has been largely absent or fragile
outside of Asia. Latin American and the Caribbean have
shown more recent signs of income growth over the last dec-
ade, while Africa and Oceania have contributed little to global
convergence. On average, in 1990, Africans earned 12% of
the developed country income when adjusted for PPP; this
ﬁgure remained the same in 2014 (Julca et al., 2015).
A universal issue
Uneven economic convergence across countries occurred
alongside an unprecedented rise in inequality within coun-
tries (Atkinson et al., 2011; Piketty and Saez, 2014). Drawing
on the new World Wealth and Income Database (WID.world,
2017), we present the evolution of top 1 per cent income
shares – a telling metric of inequality – in developed econo-
mies and developing economies alike. The extent of the
increase varies across countries, but in nearly all nations, the
general tendency is one of rising top 1 per cent income
shares since the late 1970s (Figure 1). In the USA, the top 1
per cent ﬁscal income share was close to 10 per cent 40
years ago, and is now above 20 per cent. Over the same
period, top 1 per cent ﬁscal income share increased from
6.5 per cent to 13 per cent in China (Figure 2).
Inequality as a health problem
Cross-sectional studies show a robust and statistically signiﬁ-
cant positive correlation between inequality and incidences
of health and social problems in advanced countries (see for
example Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). Wilkinson and
Figure 1. Top 1% ﬁscal income share in developed economies.
Source: WID.world
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Pickett’s prominent work, The Spirit Level, aggregates bi-vari-
ate analyses for a range of dependent variables pertaining
to health and social problems. As summarised in the post-
script to the second edition, they ﬁnd that ‘when people in
the same social class, at the same level of income or educa-
tion, are compared across countries, those in more equal
societies do better’ (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010, 275–276).
More recent work has attempted to establish causality. In a
review of the literature, Wilkinson and Pickett ﬁnd that the
major epidemiological causal criteria are ‘well supported’
and that, therefore, ‘narrowing the gap will improve the
health and wellbeing of populations’ (Wilkinson and Pickett,
2010, 316). On health, causality between inequality and
health problems is relatively well supported, though it is
understood to operate indirectly, through ‘status anxiety’,
which may explain why individual level studies ﬁnd ambigu-
ous results (Bergh et al., 2016). On the other social prob-
lems, causality is harder to establish, owing in part to the
lack of clear understanding about the causal mechanism
through which inequality impacts society (Rowlinson, 2011).
However, even without the assurance of causality, the
robust correlation between inequality and the incidence of
health and social problems is highly consistent with the
integrated SDG approach, which seeks to reinforce positive
interactions across the goals.
Inequality as an economic problem
Multiple studies support that inequality has a negative
impact on growth (Cingano, 2014; Ostry et al., 2014). Mea-
sured by the Gini index, the impact of inequality on growth
is signiﬁcant. In OECD countries, a one-point decline in the
Gini index would translate to an increase in cumulative
growth of 0.8 per cent per year for the following 5 years
(Cingano, 2014). Furthermore, inequality as measured by the
Gini coefﬁcient is a signiﬁcant explanatory variable of the
duration of growth spells: Ostry et al. (2014, p. 23) ﬁnd that
‘a one-Gini-point increase in inequality is associated with a 6
percentage point higher risk that the spell will end the next
year’. Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) have shown that a relative
rise in top quintile incomes has a negative long-term impact
on growth, while growth in the bottom quintile is highly
correlated with growth. This corroborates similar results pro-
duced by the OECD, that shows that the changes in the bot-
tom quantile as a fraction of the mean are robust and
statistically signiﬁcant explanatory variables of national
growth (Cingano, 2014).
The effect of inequality on growth can operate through
multiple channels. First, the societal problems associated with
inequality incur explicit remedial costs that would not other-
wise have been incurred if inequality were less severe. For
example, The Equality Trust (2014) estimated that, if the UK
reduced inequality so that of the OECD average, expenditure
savings on physical and mental illness, violence and imprison-
ment alone would amount to £39 billion per year. Second,
inequality harms growth by reducing disadvantaged groups’
access to public goods (Stiglitz, 2013). In a regression analysis
framework focusing on all OECD countries, Cingano (2014) ﬁnd
that the negative impact of inequality on growth is essentially
due to lesser access to education for disadvantaged groups, as
well as to the reduced quality of education for a given year of
school enrolment. This inequality in access to quality educa-
tion reduces individual capabilities throughout their lifetime,
and leads, in turn, to a decline in the productivity of the econ-
omy as a whole. Third, inequality can harm growth through
reducing motivation at work. Using randomised control trials,
Fehr et al. (2009) in Switzerland and Breza et al. (2015) in India
showed that pay inequality has strong and signiﬁcant impacts
on labour productivity: more precisely, workers paid more than
their peers do not produce more than the average, while
workers paid less exhibit a strong reduction (about 30 per cent
in the Swiss case). In a similar vein, Card et al. (2012) show
that wage inequality affects job satisfaction in California.
Fourth, low income households have a higher marginal
propensity to consume compared to high income households.
Increase in inequality thus tends to reduce overall consump-
tion growth (Johnson et al., 2006).
Inequality as a political problem
Multiple channels provide possible explanations for a link
between inequality and political instability. First, the power of
the wealthy extends to a measurable degree of inﬂuence in
the law. Through multivariate analysis of the United States,
Gilens and Page (2014, p. 564) ﬁnd that ‘economic elites and
organised groups representing business interests have substan-
tial independent impacts on US government policy, while aver-
age citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no
independent inﬂuence’. Second, McCarty et al. (2002) study the
relationship between political polarisation and inequality in the
USA, through several decades of congressmen’s vote records
and opinion polls. They show that polarisation decreased with
inequality in the ﬁrst part of the 20th Century and rose with it
from the mid-1970s onwards. Polarisation makes the Republi-
can Party more pro-rich and less likely to adopt inequality
Figure 2. Top 1% ﬁscal income share in developing and emerging
countries.
Source: WID.world
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reduction policies. A more polarised political system is also said
to be less likely to adopt transpartisan, lasting policies.
In line with the polarisation channel, a recent study shows
that individuals with stagnant incomes over the past dec-
ades in the USA and major European countries are more
likely than others to support right wing political parties and
hold negative view on immigration (Dobbs et al., 2016). The
causes for right wing political support are indeed diverse –
but such results could support the claim that rising inequali-
ties are challenging the foundations of open parliamentary
democracies (Stiglitz, 2013).
Inequality as an environmental problem
Several studies suggested a link between inequality and
environmental quality via two causal channels. The ‘Veblen
effect’ channel posits that the more unequal societies, the
more individuals consume to differentiate themselves from
other social groups. The mechanism of consumption as a
way to mark a certain lifestyle has been relatively well
established (Heffetz, 2011). Bowles and Park (2005) show
that more unequal countries are countries where people
work more and argue that this is due to a Veblen effect:
lower ranked individuals work more to replicate the lifestyle
of higher ranked individuals. When dominant lifestyles are
unsustainable – which is the case, the overall environmental
of such consumption dynamics is negative.
The other channel through which inequality impacts on
environmental quality was introduced above: unequal soci-
eties are more polarised societies, in which agreement on
trans-partisan policies (such as environmental policies) is
more complicated. Inequality renders more difﬁcult the
agreement on and the implementation of environmental
policies (Hourcade, 2013; Laurent, 2014), such as carbon
taxes. In addition, it has been argued that elites can, at least
for a certain amount of time, protect themselves from envi-
ronmental degradation (Boyce, 2007). That being said,
empirical studies on inequality and the environment offer
mixed results. While theoretical links can be convincing,
more work is required to fully understand the extent of the
problem raised by inequality on environmental degradation.
It should also be noted that inequality reduction can
nonetheless be negative for the environment: when
achieved through income growth at the bottom end of the
distribution, it can lead to higher overall pollution levels. At
the individual level, income is positively linked with carbon
emissions (Lenglart et al., 2010; Lenzen et al., 2006; Wier
et al., 2001). Therefore, under current production and con-
sumption patterns, inequality reduction achieved through
the growth of incomes among low earners would counter-
act carbon mitigation efforts at national and global scale
(Chancel and Piketty, 2015).
2. How inequality reduction has become part of
the global policy agenda
In developing a response to rising inequality, policy makers
and academia have sought to identify the drivers of
inequality. A vast literature posits and tests theoretical dri-
vers of inequality, and of subsequent policy areas to address
these drivers (for an overview of this literature, see for
example, Atkinson, 2015). The sheer scale of existing litera-
ture on this subject suggests that inaction does not derive
from a knowledge-gap. After a decade of landmark research,
coverage and quality of available data on global inequality
have expanded signiﬁcantly (Milanovic, 2013; WID.world,
2017). Though much remains to be learned, to a signiﬁcant
extent, the core drivers of inequality are known, and can
guide policy response.
It has been common to divide the drivers of inequality
into categories, ﬁrst between technology and globalisation
(for example, Katz and Autor, 1999) and then, more recently,
between technology and trade openness viewed in concert,
and policies and institutions (for example, Milanovic, 2016;
OECD, 2011). These distinctions are partly artiﬁcial and can
be, at times, misleading. The nature and extent of techno-
logical innovation and openness are, to a large extent,
determined by policies and institutions, and the effect of
both factors is itself contingent on national-level policies
and institutions (Atkinson, 2015; Mazucatto, 2013). We there-
fore endorse the view of Atkinson (2015) and others that,
based on the knowledge that we have about the drivers of
inequality, the response to rising inequality should be
framed around policies and institutions.
International development institutions have, until recently,
paid limited attention to domestic inequality issues, consider-
ing the reduction of inequalities as a sovereign issue for each
country, or positing inequalities as a necessary evil towards glo-
bal improvement of wellbeing. Domestic income inequalities
have been politically conﬁned in the shadow of absolute pov-
erty until the SDGs replaced the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs, see de Albuquerque, 2012; Kabeer, 2010; Lang-
ford, 2010). Until then, the few appearances of domestic
inequalities in the global development agenda had narrowed
them to inequalities of opportunities and access—without any
signiﬁcant mention of income or wealth (World Bank, 2006).
In this context, the unanimous endorsement of SDG Target
10.1 by the UN Member States marks an important shift. Tar-
get 10.1 explicitly includes domestic inequality reduction in
the global development agenda. It states: ‘By 2030, progres-
sively achieve and sustain a reduction in income inequality,
as measured by the share of the bottom 40 percent of the
population in national income, alongside economic growth’.
The target was the subject to harshly contested debates in
the Open Working Group in charge of establishing a list of
goals and targets for intergovernmental negotiations. There
were calls for a target for reducing income inequality within
countries, measured by the Gini coefﬁcient or the Palma
index (Engberg-Pedersen 2013). Meanwhile, the report of the
High-Level Panel argued against a target for addressing
domestic income inequality on the grounds that ‘countries
differ widely both in their view of what levels of income
inequality are acceptable and in the strategies they adopt to
reduce it.’ (HLP, 2013, p. 16) Several countries such as the
USA and Canada contended that a standalone goal on
inequality could ‘lead to a sterile debate’ and that domestic
© 2017 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Global Policy (2018) 9:1
Lucas Chancel, Alex Hough and Tancrède Voituriez8
inequality reduction would better be achieved through other
goals such as economic growth or a fair access to productive
assets. Other countries like China and Indonesia argued that
within-country inequalities objectives tended to place a
higher burden on developing countries than on OECD
economies, and that ‘promoting equality should not be a
standalone goal area.’ (Chancel and Voituriez, 2015).
After the target was removed from the draft-list in the
course of 2014, a group of countries led by Denmark, Nor-
way, and Brazil supported its re-inclusion. Denmark, along
with Norway, argued that the rise in inequalities found its
roots in ‘exclusive growth’ and that a speciﬁc metric should
be used to ensure that growth resorbs inequalities rather
than triggers them. As for Brazil, while stressing the need to
reduce between-country inequalities, it also supported the
inclusion of domestic inequality reduction targets. This sec-
ond group of countries was successful in including the
domestic target in the ﬁnal list, after campaigns from NGOs
and lobbying from inﬂuential academia such as Stiglitz
(Doyle and Stiglitz, 2014).
3. Inferring the added value of SDGs: A
framework for analysis
While there are diverse narratives explaining how and why
the SDGs were set up, the core idea is that they were
designed to ﬁll an implementation gap (Caballero, 2015;
SDSN, 2015). The 2030 Agenda calls for countries to develop
action plans from their existing national sustainable devel-
opment strategies and to align their policies with the SDGs
and associated targets.
Though the theory of change underpinning the SDGs is
not explicit when reading the Agenda 2030, it sits in a clear
lineage of ‘goal setting’ development strategies starting with
the new public management principles across public admin-
istration in OECD countries in the 1980s, and also in the
wake of the MDGs 20 years later. Young (2017) recalls that
goal setting seeks to steer behavior by: (1) establishing pri-
orities; (2) galvanising the efforts of those assigned to work
toward attaining the goals; (3) identifying targets and pro-
viding yardsticks or benchmarks to be used in tracking pro-
gress; and (4) combating the tendency for short-term
desires and impulses to distract the attention or resources
of those assigned to the work of goal attainment. He then
infers that devising a clear-cut metric is both a requirement
and expected outcome of goal-setting as a governance
strategy. Following Young (2017), we identify the provision
of a harmonised metric as the ﬁrst contribution of SDGs to
fostering action.
Furthermore, Young (2017, p. 34) makes a distinction
between goal-setting and rule-making:
The essential premise of goal setting as a gover-
nance strategy (. . .) differs from the premise under-
lying rule making. Whereas rule making features
the formulation of behavioral prescriptions (for
example, requirements and prohibitions) and
directs attention to matters of compliance and
enforcement, goal setting features the articulation
of aspirations and directs attention to procedures
for generating enthusiasm among supporters and
maximizing the dedication needed to sustain the
effort required to reach more or less well-deﬁned
targets. Moreover, whereas goal setting normally
features the mounting of a campaign designed to
attain goals within a speciﬁed time frame, rulemak-
ing features the articulation of behavioral prescrip-
tions expected to remain in place indeﬁnitely.
This distinction is particularly important in the case of the
SDGs which do not contain legally binding compliance and
enforcement mechanisms. Instead, what is implicitly
expected is that ‘(o)nce the goals are established, efforts to
attain goals normally proceed in campaign mode’ (Young,
2017, p. 33).
In concrete terms, the kind of campaign that can be
expected to foster the achievement of goal 10 and its associ-
ated targets cannot easily be prescribed. The theories of
change of campaigners would deserve a paper in its own
right. Nonetheless, some key principles to direct the cam-
paigns can be articulated. To that end we draw on a recent
paper which distilled key principles for a theory of change in
the broad ﬁeld of development (Valters, 2015). Valters posits
that theories of change serve to support learning. Following
Young et al. (2015), the purpose of learning in this context is
in being ‘accountable, improving operations, readjusting
strategy, strengthening capacity, understanding the context,
deepening understanding (research), building and sustaining
trust, lobbying and advocacy and sensitising for action’
(Valters, 2015, p. 9). The MDGs – that proceeded the SDGS –
reﬂect these principles: decisive in focusing policies, ﬁnancing
and campaigns, the ﬁrst series of development goals radically
changed donors’ conception of development, instilling the
idea of development as a trial-and-error process on the vari-
ous means for a given end – the MDG list (Banerjee and
Duﬂo, 2011). The simplicity of the targets that set absolute
goals served as a strong conduit for state action and guided
international funding organisations. Furthermore, the goals
created a simple narrative, triggering self-fulﬁlling prophecies;
they imagined a future of ‘zero hunger’, ‘half the number of
people in extreme poverty’ and in doing so they shifted
expectations and spread the idea that achieving the goals
was not only necessary but – and more importantly – possi-
ble. We infer that policy learning across countries is another
keystone of the theory of change underpinning the SDGs.
Another lesson from the MDGs is that a comparison of
countries’ performance is made possible by the existence of
a harmonised metric. Some leading scholars denounced the
MDGs on the ground that they were unfair for Sub-Saharan
African countries precisely because ranking countries
became an immediate by-product of the MDG targets
matrix (Easterly, 2007). On the other hand, one could argue
that because the SDGs were negotiated by all countries
(which was not the case for the MDGs which were set by
donor countries), the mere possibility of ranking them
becomes an implicit driver for change.
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The education survey known as the Program for Interna-
tional Student Assessment (PISA) is enlightening regarding
the impact of international rankings. Without exaggerating
its virtues, PISA has had an inﬂuence on the development of
education policies in the majority of developed countries
(Breakspear, 2012) for several reasons: ranking promotes
exchanges between policymakers and experts and allows
the strategies of leading countries in an area to be used for
comparative studies (including between countries with simi-
lar socioeconomic characteristics); it legitimises ongoing
reforms (for example the UK has used the PISA ranking to
support reforms outlined in its national strategy); it strength-
ens the quality of national assessments (expansion of the
scope of evaluation, further improvement of indicators, etc.);
and it enables policy decisions to be better informed
according to national and international requirements (Scot-
land viewed the PISA ranking as a way to measure its rela-
tive decline and to inﬂuence policy decisions, while focusing
on the national context) (Breakspear, 2012). Peer pressure is
the third keystone of the theory of change underpinning
the SDGs.
4. Assessing SDGs contribution to policy change
We assess the speciﬁc contribution of the SDG to bridging
the policy implementation gap on inequality. We ask what
the practical tools offered by the SDG framework (common
metric, peer review, and peer learning) can effectively con-
tribute to ﬁll the implementation gap in the case of income
and wealth inequality. We also identify areas where the
2030 agenda falls short in terms of ﬁlling the implementa-
tion gap. Finally, we outline the conditions under which the
utility of the SDG can be realised, and suggest options for
state and non-state actors to realise these conditions and
leverage the existing framework (Table 1).
Do the SDGs provide a common metric to track
inequality?
The 2030 Agenda calls for an extensive set of global indica-
tors in its outcome document (UN, 2015) that would be
‘simple yet robust, address all SDGs and targets including
for means of implementation.’ The framework, the resolution
notes, requires that there be ‘timely, reliable, and disaggre-
gated data to support the implementation of the ambitious
2030 Agenda’.
A common set of 230 indicators was agreed in 2016 at
UN level as the backbone of monitoring the SDGs at local,
national, regional, and global levels. They will serve as a
management tool to help countries develop implementation
strategies and allocate resources accordingly, and as a
report card to measure progress towards achieving a target
and to ensure the accountability of governments and other
stakeholders for achieving the SDGs.
Target 10 satisﬁes the broad principles of the SDG frame-
work to develop action plans from existing national sustain-
able development strategies. Over the past decades, an
increasing number of countries have adopted so-called
‘beyond GDP’ indicators to complement GDP and better
measure social, environmental and broader economic fac-
tors. A close look at national beyond-GDP initiatives shows
that inequality featured prominently among them prior to
the ﬁnalisation of the SDGs (Chancel et al., 2015). The addi-
tional value of the SDGs, in this context, is to provide a
common, universal metric. The metric carries particular
weight as it has been unanimously endorsed by the UN
Member States.
That said, the metric for measuring inequality in Target
10.1 has potential descriptive drawbacks. By ensuring that
the bottom 40 per cent does not lose out, the target clearly
reﬂects the SDG principle to ‘leave no one behind’. How-
ever, the indicator is blind to changes at the apex of the
distribution (in situations where top earners’ and bottom
earners’ incomes grow while the middle shrinks, for
instance). This amounts to more than an innocuous over-
sight. Rising top income shares drove income inequality
dynamics in the past decades (Atkinson et al., 2011; Piketty,
2014).
Table 2 shows the performance of three countries (China,
France, USA) on the SDG target, over the past 15 years
(2000–2015 period) and in the longer run (1980–2015, time
span with available and comparable data). The table revises
previous results by Chancel and Voituriez (2015). In the ear-
lier results, including a more extensive list of countries, the
results showed that countries variously passed and failed
the SDG test over different periods. In the updated data, all
three countries considered failed to meet the SDG target
10.1, suggesting that the target is more ambitious than pre-
viously assumed. Still, the target remains feasible. France
came very close to achieving the target over the 1980–2015
period, for example. In France, over the 1980–2015 period,
the bottom 40 per cent is not far from average growth but
the top 0.1 per cent earners enjoy a growth rate that is
more than ﬁve times higher. In China and the USA as well,
the gap between average growth rate and top 0.1 per cent
income growth rate (respectively 776 per cent vs. 2,271 per
cent and 70 per cent vs. 343 per cent for the 1980–2015
time period) shows the need to complement the bottom 40
per cent target.
We therefore suggest that countries interested in inequal-
ity reduction employ a complementary statistic, comparing,
when available, the evolution of top incomes (top 1 per
cent or top 0.1 per cent income shares) to average growth,
in order to capture important changes at the apex of the
income distribution. The use of complementary metrics, in
addition to the global indicators list adopted by the General
Assembly, is explicitly foreseen in the SDG framework. Para-
graph 75 of Transforming Our World : The Agenda 2030 for
Sustainable Development states: ‘The Goals and targets will
be followed-up and reviewed using a set of global indica-
tors. These will be complemented by indicators at the regio-
nal and national levels which will be developed by member
states, in addition to the outcomes of work undertaken for
the development of the baselines for those targets where
national and global baseline data does not yet exist’ (UN,
2015). The inclusion of complementary statistics is voluntary,
© 2017 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Global Policy (2018) 9:1
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based on the discretion of states. In this case, epistemic
communities have already contributed a great deal: data
about the income and wealth of the top 1 per cent pro-
duced by academia and civil society have been harnessed
by activists and NGOs to increase awareness in the issue of
rising inequality. The uptake of this complementary indicator
will therefore depend on the continued participation of civil
society actors and academia.
Table 3 informs us on another important dimension of
the debate: the source of data used to check whether coun-
tries meet the SDG objective is crucial. In Table 3, we com-
pare the data source used in Table 2 (coming from
WID.world, which combines ﬁscal sources and surveys), with
survey data from the World Panel on Income Distribution
(Lakner and Milanovic, 2013).
The main insight from this comparison is that growth
rates vary substantially according to the two sources. The
USA would pass the test according to Lakner and Milanovic
data over 1988-1998 while it clearly does not qualify in the
WID.world source. In this example, the survey data does not
capture all income growth in the US in 1988–1998, particu-
larly at the top of the distribution.
How best tackle the data source issue, given that the UN
has so far not provided speciﬁcation on data source types
that member states should use (UN, 2017)? Survey data is
well-known for its inability to capture top income dynamics
in a satisfactory way, because of underreporting and under-
sampling issues (Atkinson and Bourguignon, 2015). Addition-
ally, in the case of the widely used World Panel on Income
Distribution (Lakner and Milanovic, 2013), the surveys vari-
ously refer to consumption and to income. The level of con-
sumption inequality is always lower than income inequality
because of differential in savings rates across households.
Mixing the two concepts is thus problematic.
The SDG test will need to be based on standardised and
comparable concepts of income. The most promising way
to deal with data limitation seems to reconcile within a har-
monised framework the different sources available, namely
tax data, national accounts and household surveys (Alvaredo
et al., 2016). This is the approach which pursued at WID.
world.
Can SDGs create peer pressure and increase political will
for change?
The SDGs indicator not only provides a harmonised metric,
it also sets a threshold for the income growth of the bottom
40 per cent. The monitoring is carried out through an
annual reporting system, under the aegis of the UN Secre-
tary General, based on indicators and national statistics.
Nothing in Target 10.1 constrains the speed of inequality
reduction, nor the optimal range of outcomes that countries
should aim to achieve. Nevertheless, to reach the target,
several countries in the developed and developing world
will have to invert current inequality trends (Chancel and
Voituriez, 2015).
Increasing inequality can reﬂect the preference (or indif-
ference) of a given society, even though it is intrinsically
contrary to its own interests, as discussed in the ﬁrst section
of this paper. How preferences and interests are shaped and
Table 2. Growth and inequality in China, France and USA.
Country Period
Per adult pre-tax income total
growth (%) SDG
TEST
Bottom
40%
Top
1%
Top
0.1% Average
China 1980-2015 332 1800 2271 776 FAIL
2000-2015 182 379 450 257 FAIL
France 1980-2015 17 84 155 32 FAIL
2000-2015 4 38 82 1 FAIL
USA 1980-2015 0.4 221 343 70 FAIL
2000-2015 6 22 31 10 FAIL
Sources: WID.world (2017). Note: growth in pre-tax per adult
income. Authors’ computations. Key: Average per adult income of
the bottom 40 per cent group increased by 332 per cent in China
over the 1980–2015 period. Average per adult growth rate was
776 per cent over the period. All ﬁgures are net of inﬂation.
Table 3. Who is virtuous? On the importance of data source used.
Country Period
WID.world Dataset Lakner-Milanovic Dataset
Pre-tax income growth (%)
SDGTest
Survey income growth (%)
SDG TestBottom 40% Full population Bottom 40 % Full population
China 1988-1998 0.2 19 FAIL 24 73 FAIL
1998-2008 55 118 FAIL 44 145 FAIL
France 1988-1998 5 13 FAIL 65 17 PASS
1998-2008 8 11 FAIL 28 30 FAIL
USA 1988-1998 5 22 FAIL 19 13 PASS
1998-2008 2 11 FAIL 5 25 FAIL
Source: WID.world (2017) and World Panel on Income Distribution (Lakner and Milanovic, 2013). Authors’ computations. Note: WID.world is
based on consistent combination of tax, survey and national accounts data; the ﬁgures report the evolution of pre-tax per adult national
income. The Lakner and Milanovic Dataset reports survey data on income or on consumption.
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evolve over time is a question which has spurred passionate
debates in social sciences. The bedrock of our approach is
that additional knowledge on the state of the problem and
on the solutions space contributes to altering preferences
and the distribution of interests across stakeholders likely to
inﬂuence the policy process. The success of this approach
depends on multiple factors. Many countries – and OECD
countries in particular – have for many years submitted their
national sustainable development strategies to the critical
scrutiny of other countries (‘peer reviews’), but these assess-
ments have only had a limited inﬂuence on national policy.
It is indeed particularly difﬁcult to satisfy the conditions nec-
essary for these peer reviews to have an impact: high-level
political commitment, adequate budgetary resources,
involvement of non-state actors, and timeliness, among
other factors (Vaille and Brimont, 2016). While acknowledg-
ing these limitations, we nonetheless assume in the follow-
ing paragraphs that the dissemination of the pass and fail
tests enabled by Target 10.1. is likely to trigger peer pres-
sure that leads to action at the national level.
Is PISA-like ranking conceivable within the SDG frame-
work? PISA beneﬁts are maximised when stakeholders
recognise the indicators as legitimate, when monitoring and
reporting mechanisms are in place – as planned in the 2030
Agenda – and when evaluation results are disseminated to
the media (McGee and Gaventa, 2010). The political appeal
of ranking is particularly striking during national election
campaigns – at least among EU 27 countries. In particular,
GDP growth, unemployment rate and public spending as a
share of GDP have pervaded continental Europe in national
debates on welfare state reforms over the last two decades.
Beyond-GDP-indicators which have been developed and
included in the national jurisdiction of a few countries rest
on a similar rationale of country-to-country comparison
(Chancel et al., 2014). The interactive OECD Better Life Index
tool for instance enables people ‘ to express what matters
most to them (. . .), share and compare their answers with
people across 38 OECD member and non-member countries’
(OECD, 2016).
Practically, ranking countries could be done by comparing
the year-on-year difference between the annual growth rate
of the average income per capita and the annual growth
rate of income per capita among the bottom 40 per cent on
a country basis. Countries with the highest difference would
rank highest.
Table 4 encapsulates year-on-year values of target 10.1
and top 1 per cent per adult pre-tax income growth for
China, France and the US, from 2010 to 2013 (last available
year-on-year WID.world data) and for year 1999–2000. It pro-
vides four snap-shots of countries’ performance on the ofﬁ-
cial (bottom 40 per cent, ‘Test 1’) and complementary (top 1
per cent, ‘Test 2’) inequality targets and makes a ranking of
countries along the bottom 40 per cent income conver-
gence speed, as well as along the gap between average
and top 1 per cent growth. Looking at what dub the Test 1,
China ranked ﬁrst in 2011 and 2012 and passed the SDG
test, but failed in 2013. The other way round, the US failed
in 2011 and 2012 but topped in 2013, displaying sharp
year-on-year changes in inequality pattern. Test 2 shows
that the ranking of countries can be modiﬁed when focus-
ing on top 1 per cent income growth rather than bottom 40
per cent. In 1999–2000 for instance, France passes Test 1
but fails on Test 2.
Country ranking will be technically feasible thanks to
national statistical reports on SDGs. We must be clear how-
ever that it remains politically tricky. Ranking countries
according to their performance in achieving speciﬁc goals
and targets is very unlikely to become part of the mandate
of the UN High Level Political Forum (HLPF). This ranking
could be produced instead by coalitions of Think Tanks,
Table 4. Ranking countries along target 10.1 year-on-year values.
Country Period
Full pop.-
income
growth (%)
Test 1 Test 2
Bottom 40% -
income
growth(%)
Difference to
full pop. (P.P)
SDG
Test Rank
Top1%-
Income
growth (%)
Difference
to full
pop (P.P.)
SDG
Test Rank
USA 2012-2013 0.0 3.9 3.9 PASS 1 5.7 6 PASS 2
France 0.2 2.7 2.9 PASS 2 14.6 14 PASS 1
China 9.0 7.6 1.4 FAIL 3 9.5 1 FAIL 3
China 2011-2012 8.2 10.9 2.7 PASS 1 1.9 6 PASS 1
France 2.7 2.1 0.6 PASS 2 3.1 0 PASS 2
USA 2.2 0.3 2.5 FAIL 3 8.4 6 FAIL 3
China 2010-2011 7.2 9.7 2.5 PASS 1 3.4 4 PASS 1
France 3.7 0.4 3.3 FAIL 2 28.0 24 FAIL 3
USA 1.5 1.9 3.4 FAIL 3 0.4 1 PASS 2
France 1999-2000 2.7 2.7 0.0 PASS 1 5.1 2 FAIL 1
USA 3.5 2.0 1.5 FAIL 2 6.8 3 FAIL 2
China 2.2 5.3 7.5 FAIL 3 6.8 5 FAIL 3
Source: WID.world (2017). Income growth rates correspond to real per adult pre-tax national income. Figures corrected for inﬂation. Authors
computations.
Global Policy (2018) 9:1 © 2017 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Reducing Inequalities within Countries 13
research institutions and civil society organisations (CSO)
outside of the UN system. Some initiatives are underway.
Taking a comprehensive approach of the SDGs, the SDSN
has developed a SDG index and dashboard for country rank-
ing (SDSN, 2016). The Migration and Development Civil Soci-
ety Network (MADE) in cooperation with Cordaid has
drafted ‘Proposals for Shadow Reporting on SDG implemen-
tation’ (MADE, 2015). Transparency International issued a
methodological note for SDG shadow reporting question-
naire to ‘help assess progress towards three SDG targets
linked to anti-corruption and government transparency’ and
make comparisons across countries (Transparency Interna-
tional, 2017). In this context there both a clear need and a
space for inequality ranking across countries that could be
ﬁlled by the economic inequality and environmental
inequality communities together.
Can SDGs provide a platform for learning?
A third contribution of SDGs in converting policy discourses
into action is the opportunity they provide to compare pol-
icy performance across countries, and learn from both suc-
cesses and failures. The simple fact of providing a platform
for comparison of countries’ performance and to derive
applicable policy solutions in different contexts does not
guarantee that this process will take place, as it depends to
a large extent on political will. Recent evidence from climate
change policies tend to suggest that countries can learn
from one another and reduce their own risk aversion toward
sustainable development policies (Colombier, 2015; Henry
and Tubiana, forthcoming). By making the case that reduc-
ing inequality is feasible, one country’s success can elicit
political traction in another country and realise the ambition
of the 2030 Agenda to make SDG implementation a gen-
uine experimentation process.
There are already dedicated platforms to enable mutual
learning among countries. At the opening of the 2016
High-Level Political Forum (HLPF) on the Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals, Under-Secretary-General Wu Hongbo com-
mented that ‘the lessons you have offered, the actions you
have showcased, and the gaps you have identiﬁed, they are
what this Forum is about: advancing the SDGs through shar-
ing of experiences, and mutual learning’ (UNDESA, 2016).
The Forum included SDGs Learning, Training and Practice
sessions ‘providing capacity building, networking and experi-
ence-sharing opportunities on crucial topics related to the
implementation of the 2030 Agenda’.
The issue of inequality is highly suited to this kind of plat-
form. An expanding literature has identiﬁed an extensive
range of national level policy responses that states may
adopt in addressing high or rising inequality, and further-
more, many countries have successfully implemented poli-
cies to reduce inequality. Some preeminent examples, like
the case of Chile since the middle of the 2000s, offer scope
for learning and adoption by other countries and the sus-
tainable development platform provides a dedicated plat-
form to that end (Martinez-Aguilar et al., 2017). Examples
such as the case of Chile where ﬁscal interventions covering
a wide range of instruments also support a process of
South-North learning. It is hoped that such a process would
increase the buy-in for the broader goals among countries
in the Global South.
However, much remains to be done to increase the func-
tionality of the mutual learning process – of genuine peer
learning. Greater focus is required to encourage and vitalise
the learning process beyond current state practice at UN
HLPF which is overly permissive of countries ‘showcasing’
national strategies and anecdotal successes, as it was the
case at the time of the UN Commission on Sustainable
Development which preceded the HLPF. Forums cannot sim-
ply serve as platforms for states to boast about their individ-
ual successes while overshadowing and overlooking areas of
inaction or underperformance. Building on Chancel et al.
(2017), we thus propose: (1) the publication of an
annual statistical and policy report ranking countries over
their performance on SDG target 10.1. This report could
include contributions from academia but should eventually
be endorsed by the United Nations Statistical Agency. G20
countries could take the lead on this; (2) this report would
contain – or would be supplemented by a side-report on –
a discussion of successful and less successful policies imple-
mented in different countries to tackle inequality and
(3) the report would be presented and discussed at an
annual global inequality conference. These conferences
could be kickstarted by civil society, the academia or G20
hosts, but they should be eventually organised by the Uni-
ted Nations.
Conclusion
Rising economic inequality within countries is a deﬁning
challenge of our time. A growing body of literature high-
lights the negative impacts of domestic inequality on a wide
number of political, social, economic and environmental
problems – thus rendering domestic inequality a key sus-
tainable development challenge. However, over the past
decade, despite growing concern, debates have not been
converted into action and domestic inequality keeps rising.
The inclusion of inequality within the Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals framework shows that the United Nation
Member States are formally committed to tackle this prob-
lem. One can wonder however what could be the effective
contribution of a United Nations process which does not
have any binding mechanism. What comes out of our
research is that the SDGs provide three levers to turn the
global inequality debate into action: peer focus (a common
metric), peer pressure (a ranking of countries) and peer
review (mutual learning of policies). The contribution of
SDGs to each of these levers is however not equal. While
the common metric exists, only signiﬁcant involvement from
civil society, epistemic communities which were more con-
cerned so far with domestic economic debates surrounding
inequality, and the commitment from governments will
make it possible for peer pressure and learning to become
effective. These three effective and potential contributions
of SDG stand out as necessary conditions to transform the
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global inequality debate into action. But they are not sufﬁ-
cient: in particular, the relationship between SDGs and inter-
national trade, investment deals and ﬁscal agreements will
also need to be clariﬁed – replacing such discussions at the
centre of the policy agenda is another potential side-effect
of the SDG impetus.
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